What Are Test Cases?

W. Andy Knight has an interesting article in The Mark today on the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The quote below I find particularly interesting:

"The international society of states still relies heavily on the Westphalian notion that state sovereignty includes the legal right of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. This is most clearly evidenced by the lack of action by the 'international community' in areas like the Darfur region of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burma, among others. For R2P to become international law, it would require many more years of not just debate in the UN Security Council and General Assembly, but also testing in actual cases." -- W. Andy Knight

The idea of test cases would require that norms like non-intervention would be removed for certain situations and maintained for others. This raises the question: what qualities make certain situations better than others to be test cases? Not that I am against R2P, but is there not already a problem within the UN of rules applying to some and not others? The problem with test cases is that utilizing them would mean that the international community openly accepts this idea that rules would not apply to some people. Once this happens, how can any rules have effect?

- blenCOWe

Back in the Game

What a semester! I haven't been blogging this past semester but this will change in the new year. The first four months of my master's degree has flown by quickly and with all the weekly preparation and work I decided to take a break from my blogging activities. But now I am back and will be blogging as regularly as possible.

- blenCOWe

Speaking a Different Language Than Everyone Else

I was reading the latest article in Embassy about Romeo Dallaire's response to the change in diplomatic language regarding child soldiers (or "children in armed conflict") and it got me thinking about the effect this might have on Canada's efforts on this issue and the other areas that received a "Harper-izing" of diplomatic language. If we start changing the language our diplomats can use from the language that is normally used by the majority of others in the international community, isn't the chance for communication failures greater? Why is it necessary for Canada to be using a different language from everyone else when talking about subjects that require a great deal of multilateral cooperation for any real progress to be made? Changing the language that diplomats are allowed to use makes confusion more likely and cooperation more difficult and timely.

The Harper government has maintained that the change in language was done in order to have Canada's diplomats using words that are more in line with the policies of the current government. Doesn't this then indicate that the priorities of the government of Canada are changing from the priorities of the rest of the international community? If, though, Canada's priorities in these areas are not different from everyone else then I would view the changes as creating more trouble than they are worth and likely problematic.

One interesting view considered by the article was that the change reflects an expansion of policy to consider more than just children who act as soldiers:

" 'Child soldiers' generally includes only youth and children who act as armed militants, while 'children in armed conflict' would theoretically encompass those used as porters, water carriers and in other support activities. It would also include girls and young women who are held as sex slaves or used to manage an operation's logistics. Essentially, it enlarges the definition to include those who participate in combat or are exploited by it, but aren't armed."

Now, I might be more inclined to believe that the change in language represented an expansion of the focus of the policies to account for a more inclusive definition if the Harper government had not been fighting efforts to repatriate Omar Khadr so vigourously. In my opinion Mr. Khadr falls under the subject of child soldier, but even if you disagree with that, he would definitely be counted as a child in armed conflict give the fact that he was a minor when captured. As such, it is clear from the actions of the Harper government that the change in language does not represent an expansion of term but merely more political games by the Conservative government.

- blenCOWe

True Canadian-Style Foreign Policy

Now this is the type of foreign policy objective that Canada should be pursuing.

"Hundreds of Order of Canada recipients, representing some of the country's leading scientific, cultural and political luminaries, are joining a growing global groundswell calling for a multilateral agreement to end the use of nuclear weapons."

Too bad it couldn't come from the Conservative government... you know, the people whose job it is to construct and pursue Canada's foreign policy.

- blenCOWe

European Security Treaty will be an another example of failed collective security

In last week's edition of the Embassy the head of the Russian Embassy to Canada's political section, Dimitry Trofimov, has an article attempting to glorify Russian President Dimitry Medvedev's proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST), claiming that"it could provide equal and indivisible security for all states, both members and non-members of any given bloc, and create a common set of co-ordinates agreed by all 56 states in the Euro-Atlantic area." He goes on to suggest "such a treaty should create in the Euro-Atlantic area a reliable collective security system on the basis of principles of polycentrism, rule of international law and the central role of the United Nations, unified and indivisible security of all states, inadmissibility of isolation of any state, and the creation of zones with different levels of security."

The problem with collective security is that it has never worked as it is supposed to function. The idea behind collective security is that it is an alternative to the balance of power. Its principle, as Earnest Claude puts it, is "that in the relation of nations, everyone is his brother's keeper." All states guarantee to secure, collectively, each and every state that is party to the system. Any threat to the peace by any state to any other state must be seen as a threat to the security of all states and they must respond accordingly. The problem with CS is that when threats to the peace are identified, the call to respond has never been recognized and responded to by all the member states of the security organization.

Now advocates of this treaty might argue that in smaller numbers, collective security is more likely to work but given the fact that on the UN Security Council, Russia has been a regular roadblock to proposals for humanitarian and other types of intervention as have other European powers, France and Germany. Furthermore, France has only just rejoined the integrated command structure of NATO, with domestic protest, after many years. With this in mind, what are the chances that these "reluctant" powers will act more often and with greater effect when history has shown them not to be.

Rather than building another toothless security organization that will only further clutter the international community, the European community might be better served to work to make the United Nation's collective security mechanisms more effective.

There are also problems with how the EST would be structured. One of the themes that Mr. Trofimov identifies is that all members would be guaranteed equal security and that no member would seek to provide for their own security at the cost of the security of another state. The problem is that this theme also "respects the right of any state to maintain neutrality." This means that if it is not in the best interests of a state to become involved in a conflict then it is not required to participate. Therefore, the same problem of participation that is faced by the UN is again confronted in this treaty. There is also the inherent conflict, routinely found in collective security, that the treaty guarantees that the other member states will come to the rescue of an embattled member, but then weakens this guarantee by allowing states to opt out of any missions it does not want to participate in. This is the same design that the UN's security mechanisms employ thus making this agreement unnecessary and possibly even make it less likely for the UN's mechanisms to work when needed.

I wonder why Russia is proposing this now when one year ago, if this agreement had been in place, Russia would likely have been confronted by the organization's members over the conflict in Georgia (not to mention Georgia's ally, the United States). But therein may lay the answer; Russia might be proposing this new security organism in response to the US presence currently found in Europe's predominant security structures. This proposal could very well be Russia's newest response to NATO eastward expansion and have no real concern for an effective security organization in Europe.

- blenCOWe

Sovereignty Revoked!

I didn't think things like this could still happen,

"THE self-rule that the Turks and Caicos islands have enjoyed for 33 years was taken away on August 14th, when Britain removed their elected premier, cabinet and assembly, and suspended most of their constitution. For the next two years or so the islands, whose population is around 38,000, will be run by their governor—the representative of Queen Elizabeth.

Britain felt it had few choices, following the publication last month of a report by an inquiry, headed by Sir Robin Auld, a former British judge, which found a 'high probability of systemic corruption' in the tiny country’s government, with ministers apparently bribed by foreign property developers. Sir Robin described the situation as a 'national emergency'. He recommended a police investigation of Michael Misick, who resigned as premier in March but denies wrongdoing, and other government figures. The report noted Mr Misick’s reputation for enjoying a 'Hollywood lifestyle' and said his spending habits 'far exceeded his salary and allowances'."

- blenCOWe

More Cuts Threaten Canada's Foreign Policy Priorities

One again Canadians are finding out how the manner in which the Harper government plans to achieve its foreign policy goals in these times of fiscal restraint. The word of the day is that nasty little "c-word" known as cuts.

An article in today's Embassy announced that at the end of July, all of Canada's "Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Charges d'Affaires were told that program budgets for all missions were being immediately cut by 50 per cent. The program budget pays for such things as attending and hosting events and conferences, public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy."

Now cuts to some things like hosted events and conferences were expected and it is reasonable, to some extent, that things like events and conferences face cuts when money is tight. However, to make drastic cuts to the funding of public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy constitutes what I believe to be a direct threat to Canada's ability to pursue its foreign policy objectives.

Canada is currently on a rocky foreign policy path and cuts like this can transform rocky into treacherous. Right now some of the Canadian government's foreign policy priorities include campaigning for a seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2010 as well as smoothing over a shift in governmental priorities towards Latin and South American that has left many states in Africa feeling more than a little bit jilted. Dealing with these challenges requires a fair amount of engagement in the international community and perfect examples of this are public diplomacy and human rights advocacy. These types of diplomatic initiative are crucial to build up Canada's image and influence in international relations and to cut the budgets for these programs across the board and by half shows that the Harper government is not backing up their stated intentions to pursue its objectives with the resources necessary to be effective in the pursuit.

Probably even worse is that this looks to be the beginning of another political game. The way I see, the Harper government is hoping to make DFAIT look like it is being fiscally irresponsible by introducing the cuts at a time that will practically ensure that the missions abroad will be over budget. How does the Harper government expect the missions to stay under budget when they cut half of the budget half-way through the fiscal year. Realistically it is possible that many missions have already spent their new budget allocations thus placing them in the difficult position of spending more than their budget, canceling the rest of those programs' events for the rest of the year or redirecting some of the funds of the other programs that have already faced to cuts to attempt to save some of these diplomatic necessities. In times of fiscal crunch, government departments, especially ones that some Canadians may not see the benefits from on a regular or semi-regular basis, that go over budget are almost destined to become political scapegoats. This doesn't strike me as an example of good governance (oops, Liberal-Era language!) when the political masters of departments are setting up the civil servants, that run them, to fail!

How does Harper believe, and expect Canadians to believe, that Canada is being guided through these difficult times in a manner that will be beneficial to the nation?

- blenCOWe