Now this is the type of foreign policy objective that Canada should be pursuing.
"Hundreds of Order of Canada recipients, representing some of the country's leading scientific, cultural and political luminaries, are joining a growing global groundswell calling for a multilateral agreement to end the use of nuclear weapons."
Too bad it couldn't come from the Conservative government... you know, the people whose job it is to construct and pursue Canada's foreign policy.
- blenCOWe
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Monday, August 24, 2009
European Security Treaty will be an another example of failed collective security
In last week's edition of the Embassy the head of the Russian Embassy to Canada's political section, Dimitry Trofimov, has an article attempting to glorify Russian President Dimitry Medvedev's proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST), claiming that"it could provide equal and indivisible security for all states, both members and non-members of any given bloc, and create a common set of co-ordinates agreed by all 56 states in the Euro-Atlantic area." He goes on to suggest "such a treaty should create in the Euro-Atlantic area a reliable collective security system on the basis of principles of polycentrism, rule of international law and the central role of the United Nations, unified and indivisible security of all states, inadmissibility of isolation of any state, and the creation of zones with different levels of security."
The problem with collective security is that it has never worked as it is supposed to function. The idea behind collective security is that it is an alternative to the balance of power. Its principle, as Earnest Claude puts it, is "that in the relation of nations, everyone is his brother's keeper." All states guarantee to secure, collectively, each and every state that is party to the system. Any threat to the peace by any state to any other state must be seen as a threat to the security of all states and they must respond accordingly. The problem with CS is that when threats to the peace are identified, the call to respond has never been recognized and responded to by all the member states of the security organization.
Now advocates of this treaty might argue that in smaller numbers, collective security is more likely to work but given the fact that on the UN Security Council, Russia has been a regular roadblock to proposals for humanitarian and other types of intervention as have other European powers, France and Germany. Furthermore, France has only just rejoined the integrated command structure of NATO, with domestic protest, after many years. With this in mind, what are the chances that these "reluctant" powers will act more often and with greater effect when history has shown them not to be.
Rather than building another toothless security organization that will only further clutter the international community, the European community might be better served to work to make the United Nation's collective security mechanisms more effective.
There are also problems with how the EST would be structured. One of the themes that Mr. Trofimov identifies is that all members would be guaranteed equal security and that no member would seek to provide for their own security at the cost of the security of another state. The problem is that this theme also "respects the right of any state to maintain neutrality." This means that if it is not in the best interests of a state to become involved in a conflict then it is not required to participate. Therefore, the same problem of participation that is faced by the UN is again confronted in this treaty. There is also the inherent conflict, routinely found in collective security, that the treaty guarantees that the other member states will come to the rescue of an embattled member, but then weakens this guarantee by allowing states to opt out of any missions it does not want to participate in. This is the same design that the UN's security mechanisms employ thus making this agreement unnecessary and possibly even make it less likely for the UN's mechanisms to work when needed.
I wonder why Russia is proposing this now when one year ago, if this agreement had been in place, Russia would likely have been confronted by the organization's members over the conflict in Georgia (not to mention Georgia's ally, the United States). But therein may lay the answer; Russia might be proposing this new security organism in response to the US presence currently found in Europe's predominant security structures. This proposal could very well be Russia's newest response to NATO eastward expansion and have no real concern for an effective security organization in Europe.
- blenCOWe
The problem with collective security is that it has never worked as it is supposed to function. The idea behind collective security is that it is an alternative to the balance of power. Its principle, as Earnest Claude puts it, is "that in the relation of nations, everyone is his brother's keeper." All states guarantee to secure, collectively, each and every state that is party to the system. Any threat to the peace by any state to any other state must be seen as a threat to the security of all states and they must respond accordingly. The problem with CS is that when threats to the peace are identified, the call to respond has never been recognized and responded to by all the member states of the security organization.
Now advocates of this treaty might argue that in smaller numbers, collective security is more likely to work but given the fact that on the UN Security Council, Russia has been a regular roadblock to proposals for humanitarian and other types of intervention as have other European powers, France and Germany. Furthermore, France has only just rejoined the integrated command structure of NATO, with domestic protest, after many years. With this in mind, what are the chances that these "reluctant" powers will act more often and with greater effect when history has shown them not to be.
Rather than building another toothless security organization that will only further clutter the international community, the European community might be better served to work to make the United Nation's collective security mechanisms more effective.
There are also problems with how the EST would be structured. One of the themes that Mr. Trofimov identifies is that all members would be guaranteed equal security and that no member would seek to provide for their own security at the cost of the security of another state. The problem is that this theme also "respects the right of any state to maintain neutrality." This means that if it is not in the best interests of a state to become involved in a conflict then it is not required to participate. Therefore, the same problem of participation that is faced by the UN is again confronted in this treaty. There is also the inherent conflict, routinely found in collective security, that the treaty guarantees that the other member states will come to the rescue of an embattled member, but then weakens this guarantee by allowing states to opt out of any missions it does not want to participate in. This is the same design that the UN's security mechanisms employ thus making this agreement unnecessary and possibly even make it less likely for the UN's mechanisms to work when needed.
I wonder why Russia is proposing this now when one year ago, if this agreement had been in place, Russia would likely have been confronted by the organization's members over the conflict in Georgia (not to mention Georgia's ally, the United States). But therein may lay the answer; Russia might be proposing this new security organism in response to the US presence currently found in Europe's predominant security structures. This proposal could very well be Russia's newest response to NATO eastward expansion and have no real concern for an effective security organization in Europe.
- blenCOWe
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Sovereignty Revoked!
I didn't think things like this could still happen,
"THE self-rule that the Turks and Caicos islands have enjoyed for 33 years was taken away on August 14th, when Britain removed their elected premier, cabinet and assembly, and suspended most of their constitution. For the next two years or so the islands, whose population is around 38,000, will be run by their governor—the representative of Queen Elizabeth.
Britain felt it had few choices, following the publication last month of a report by an inquiry, headed by Sir Robin Auld, a former British judge, which found a 'high probability of systemic corruption' in the tiny country’s government, with ministers apparently bribed by foreign property developers. Sir Robin described the situation as a 'national emergency'. He recommended a police investigation of Michael Misick, who resigned as premier in March but denies wrongdoing, and other government figures. The report noted Mr Misick’s reputation for enjoying a 'Hollywood lifestyle' and said his spending habits 'far exceeded his salary and allowances'."
- blenCOWe
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
More Cuts Threaten Canada's Foreign Policy Priorities
One again Canadians are finding out how the manner in which the Harper government plans to achieve its foreign policy goals in these times of fiscal restraint. The word of the day is that nasty little "c-word" known as cuts.
An article in today's Embassy announced that at the end of July, all of Canada's "Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Charges d'Affaires were told that program budgets for all missions were being immediately cut by 50 per cent. The program budget pays for such things as attending and hosting events and conferences, public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy."
Now cuts to some things like hosted events and conferences were expected and it is reasonable, to some extent, that things like events and conferences face cuts when money is tight. However, to make drastic cuts to the funding of public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy constitutes what I believe to be a direct threat to Canada's ability to pursue its foreign policy objectives.
Canada is currently on a rocky foreign policy path and cuts like this can transform rocky into treacherous. Right now some of the Canadian government's foreign policy priorities include campaigning for a seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2010 as well as smoothing over a shift in governmental priorities towards Latin and South American that has left many states in Africa feeling more than a little bit jilted. Dealing with these challenges requires a fair amount of engagement in the international community and perfect examples of this are public diplomacy and human rights advocacy. These types of diplomatic initiative are crucial to build up Canada's image and influence in international relations and to cut the budgets for these programs across the board and by half shows that the Harper government is not backing up their stated intentions to pursue its objectives with the resources necessary to be effective in the pursuit.
Probably even worse is that this looks to be the beginning of another political game. The way I see, the Harper government is hoping to make DFAIT look like it is being fiscally irresponsible by introducing the cuts at a time that will practically ensure that the missions abroad will be over budget. How does the Harper government expect the missions to stay under budget when they cut half of the budget half-way through the fiscal year. Realistically it is possible that many missions have already spent their new budget allocations thus placing them in the difficult position of spending more than their budget, canceling the rest of those programs' events for the rest of the year or redirecting some of the funds of the other programs that have already faced to cuts to attempt to save some of these diplomatic necessities. In times of fiscal crunch, government departments, especially ones that some Canadians may not see the benefits from on a regular or semi-regular basis, that go over budget are almost destined to become political scapegoats. This doesn't strike me as an example of good governance (oops, Liberal-Era language!) when the political masters of departments are setting up the civil servants, that run them, to fail!
How does Harper believe, and expect Canadians to believe, that Canada is being guided through these difficult times in a manner that will be beneficial to the nation?
- blenCOWe
An article in today's Embassy announced that at the end of July, all of Canada's "Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Charges d'Affaires were told that program budgets for all missions were being immediately cut by 50 per cent. The program budget pays for such things as attending and hosting events and conferences, public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy."
Now cuts to some things like hosted events and conferences were expected and it is reasonable, to some extent, that things like events and conferences face cuts when money is tight. However, to make drastic cuts to the funding of public diplomacy efforts and human rights advocacy constitutes what I believe to be a direct threat to Canada's ability to pursue its foreign policy objectives.
Canada is currently on a rocky foreign policy path and cuts like this can transform rocky into treacherous. Right now some of the Canadian government's foreign policy priorities include campaigning for a seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2010 as well as smoothing over a shift in governmental priorities towards Latin and South American that has left many states in Africa feeling more than a little bit jilted. Dealing with these challenges requires a fair amount of engagement in the international community and perfect examples of this are public diplomacy and human rights advocacy. These types of diplomatic initiative are crucial to build up Canada's image and influence in international relations and to cut the budgets for these programs across the board and by half shows that the Harper government is not backing up their stated intentions to pursue its objectives with the resources necessary to be effective in the pursuit.
Probably even worse is that this looks to be the beginning of another political game. The way I see, the Harper government is hoping to make DFAIT look like it is being fiscally irresponsible by introducing the cuts at a time that will practically ensure that the missions abroad will be over budget. How does the Harper government expect the missions to stay under budget when they cut half of the budget half-way through the fiscal year. Realistically it is possible that many missions have already spent their new budget allocations thus placing them in the difficult position of spending more than their budget, canceling the rest of those programs' events for the rest of the year or redirecting some of the funds of the other programs that have already faced to cuts to attempt to save some of these diplomatic necessities. In times of fiscal crunch, government departments, especially ones that some Canadians may not see the benefits from on a regular or semi-regular basis, that go over budget are almost destined to become political scapegoats. This doesn't strike me as an example of good governance (oops, Liberal-Era language!) when the political masters of departments are setting up the civil servants, that run them, to fail!
How does Harper believe, and expect Canadians to believe, that Canada is being guided through these difficult times in a manner that will be beneficial to the nation?
- blenCOWe
My Spin on Drezner's IR Zombies
One of the latest things to hit the blogosphere has been the mathematical exercise by Canadian researchers that concluded that "only frequent counter-attacks with increasing force would eradicate the fictional creatures."
When I read this a couple days ago when it came out, I'll admit I laughed a little bit about it but didn't really give it a second thought. But now thanks to Daniel Drezner, I have returned to weigh in on the subject of the "emerging threat from zombies." Today, Prof. Drezner wrote what I thought was a creative blog post on the application of theories of international politics to the zombie "problem." However, I believe there exists a significant problem in his analysis; zombies are not cognitive and rational beings. I do not claim to be an expert of zombies in any manner but the way I understand them, they are driven solely by their desire to eat the brains of other people. There is no greater motive than them other than sustenance.
In his structural realist analysis, Drezner claims "that there is no inherent difference between human states and zombie states. Regardless of individual traits or domestic institutions, human and zombie actors alike are subject to the same powerful constraint of anarchy." Furthermore, he adds that "it might even be tactically wise to fashion temporary alliances with certain zombie states as a way to balance against human states that try to exploit the situation with some kind of idealistic power grab made under the guise of anti-zombeism." The problem I see here is that both instances require the zombies to be thinking and acting like rational beings. Zombies and humans are not equally subject to the constraint of anarchy because zombies are unable to comprehend what anarchy is and how it threatens them as well lacking the mental capability to devise a strategy that is in their best interests. Therefore, I believe he is wrong when he concludes that "the introduction of zombies would not fundamentally alter the character of world politics." World politics would indeed be changed because of the introduction of a threat that will recklessly chase after its one goal; brains. An entity which has yet to be seen in world politics.
In terms of his liberal institutionalist and constructivist analyses, Drezner is counting on the fact that the zombies would have the cognitive ability to calculate the benefits and drawbacks to collaborating with other actors. As such, any ideas of building an international organization, including the presence of zombies, to deal with the presence of zombies or to build a world state inclusive of zombies appears to be quite impossible.
Lastly, when he addresses neoconservatism he recognizes that the zombie threat was an existential threat, noting that the threat from zombies is from their jealously over our freedom and not from their desire for our brains. Like the faults with the other theories, this analysis is based on the faulty assumption that zombies have the ability to make cognitive decisions like that. The unavoidable fact is simple, zombies pose a threat to humans because of their desire for brains and for no other reason.
The way I see it, it is possible from the perspective of humans to account for the presence of a zombie threat in this world, in international relations theory. However, in all the different ways that I have looked at it I do not see a way to include zombies into a theory in any role more than a threat. By this I mean that like environmental degradation, zombies pose a threat to the existence of humans but are not able to think rationally and are dependent on their natural circumstances (the need to consume brains). Thus, zombies are a threat and not an actor in international relations theory.
On a side note this has been kind of a fun post to write so thank you Prof. Drezner. Now I am going to go listen to Michael Jackson's Thriller because it just seems appropriate.
- blenCOWe
When I read this a couple days ago when it came out, I'll admit I laughed a little bit about it but didn't really give it a second thought. But now thanks to Daniel Drezner, I have returned to weigh in on the subject of the "emerging threat from zombies." Today, Prof. Drezner wrote what I thought was a creative blog post on the application of theories of international politics to the zombie "problem." However, I believe there exists a significant problem in his analysis; zombies are not cognitive and rational beings. I do not claim to be an expert of zombies in any manner but the way I understand them, they are driven solely by their desire to eat the brains of other people. There is no greater motive than them other than sustenance.
In his structural realist analysis, Drezner claims "that there is no inherent difference between human states and zombie states. Regardless of individual traits or domestic institutions, human and zombie actors alike are subject to the same powerful constraint of anarchy." Furthermore, he adds that "it might even be tactically wise to fashion temporary alliances with certain zombie states as a way to balance against human states that try to exploit the situation with some kind of idealistic power grab made under the guise of anti-zombeism." The problem I see here is that both instances require the zombies to be thinking and acting like rational beings. Zombies and humans are not equally subject to the constraint of anarchy because zombies are unable to comprehend what anarchy is and how it threatens them as well lacking the mental capability to devise a strategy that is in their best interests. Therefore, I believe he is wrong when he concludes that "the introduction of zombies would not fundamentally alter the character of world politics." World politics would indeed be changed because of the introduction of a threat that will recklessly chase after its one goal; brains. An entity which has yet to be seen in world politics.
In terms of his liberal institutionalist and constructivist analyses, Drezner is counting on the fact that the zombies would have the cognitive ability to calculate the benefits and drawbacks to collaborating with other actors. As such, any ideas of building an international organization, including the presence of zombies, to deal with the presence of zombies or to build a world state inclusive of zombies appears to be quite impossible.
Lastly, when he addresses neoconservatism he recognizes that the zombie threat was an existential threat, noting that the threat from zombies is from their jealously over our freedom and not from their desire for our brains. Like the faults with the other theories, this analysis is based on the faulty assumption that zombies have the ability to make cognitive decisions like that. The unavoidable fact is simple, zombies pose a threat to humans because of their desire for brains and for no other reason.
The way I see it, it is possible from the perspective of humans to account for the presence of a zombie threat in this world, in international relations theory. However, in all the different ways that I have looked at it I do not see a way to include zombies into a theory in any role more than a threat. By this I mean that like environmental degradation, zombies pose a threat to the existence of humans but are not able to think rationally and are dependent on their natural circumstances (the need to consume brains). Thus, zombies are a threat and not an actor in international relations theory.
On a side note this has been kind of a fun post to write so thank you Prof. Drezner. Now I am going to go listen to Michael Jackson's Thriller because it just seems appropriate.
- blenCOWe
Sunday, August 16, 2009
I Guess It's Not Easy Being A Rising Power
In the Economist this past week there was an interesting article about some of the recent foreign policy woes of rising power Brazil. Apparently being one of the up and coming class of new powers is not all that it may be cracked up to be. There seems to be some difference of opinion concerning whether or not the direction the Lula has been guiding Brazil on its current rise in power is in the best interests of the country.
Brazillian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's "predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, sought to boost trade and other ties with the United States and Europe. On taking office in 2003, Lula placed new stress on south-south ties. Brazil has doubled the number of its embassies in Africa, to 30, and joined or set up a clutch of new clubs. These include IBSA, with India and South Africa, of which Itamaraty, the foreign ministry, is especially proud."
This seems, to me, to be a typical dilemma for any power that is determined to rise up global hierarchy. A potential power can either choose to align itself with the old world powers of the industrial northern hemisphere or with the relatively uncertain but potentially prosperous states of the southern hemisphere.
For now though, Lula (and therefore Brazil's) decision to focus on its fellow economies of the South has appeared to have been a wise decision. "As evidence that this policy has borne fruit, Celso Amorim, the foreign minister, points out that most of Brazil’s trade is now with developing countries, thus anticipating Mr Obama’s advice that the world should not rely on the United States as consumer of last resort."
Brazil's foreign policies however have run into problems with its neighbours in South America. In his attempts to bolster the prosperity of the South American continent by increasing cooperation and collaboration amongst its neighbours. However, when
"Brazil embraced Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, inviting it to join the Mercosur trade block. The naivety of this approach became apparent when Bolivia, at Mr Chávez’s urging, nationalised the local operations of Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company. In what has been called the 'diplomacy of generosity' towards left-wing governments in its smaller neighbours, Brazil agreed to pay more for Bolivian gas. Last month it similarly agreed to pay Paraguay more for electricity from Itaipu, the hydroelectric dam they share."
and then more recently at the meeting of Union of South American Nations (which Brazil initiated) in the Ecuadorean capital Quito,
"Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, backed by his allies, Bolivia and Ecuador, wanted to condemn Colombia for granting facilities at seven military bases to the United States, which is helping it battle guerrillas and drug-traffickers. 'Winds of war are blowing,' he thundered. Four countries, including Chile and Peru, backed Colombia."
It just seems tragic that Brazil has been pursuing a path that has largely shielded it from the problems of the economic downturn but then faces bumps on that path because of its squabbling neighbours.
- blenCOWe
Brazillian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's "predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, sought to boost trade and other ties with the United States and Europe. On taking office in 2003, Lula placed new stress on south-south ties. Brazil has doubled the number of its embassies in Africa, to 30, and joined or set up a clutch of new clubs. These include IBSA, with India and South Africa, of which Itamaraty, the foreign ministry, is especially proud."
This seems, to me, to be a typical dilemma for any power that is determined to rise up global hierarchy. A potential power can either choose to align itself with the old world powers of the industrial northern hemisphere or with the relatively uncertain but potentially prosperous states of the southern hemisphere.
For now though, Lula (and therefore Brazil's) decision to focus on its fellow economies of the South has appeared to have been a wise decision. "As evidence that this policy has borne fruit, Celso Amorim, the foreign minister, points out that most of Brazil’s trade is now with developing countries, thus anticipating Mr Obama’s advice that the world should not rely on the United States as consumer of last resort."
Brazil's foreign policies however have run into problems with its neighbours in South America. In his attempts to bolster the prosperity of the South American continent by increasing cooperation and collaboration amongst its neighbours. However, when
"Brazil embraced Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, inviting it to join the Mercosur trade block. The naivety of this approach became apparent when Bolivia, at Mr Chávez’s urging, nationalised the local operations of Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company. In what has been called the 'diplomacy of generosity' towards left-wing governments in its smaller neighbours, Brazil agreed to pay more for Bolivian gas. Last month it similarly agreed to pay Paraguay more for electricity from Itaipu, the hydroelectric dam they share."
and then more recently at the meeting of Union of South American Nations (which Brazil initiated) in the Ecuadorean capital Quito,
"Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s president, backed by his allies, Bolivia and Ecuador, wanted to condemn Colombia for granting facilities at seven military bases to the United States, which is helping it battle guerrillas and drug-traffickers. 'Winds of war are blowing,' he thundered. Four countries, including Chile and Peru, backed Colombia."
It just seems tragic that Brazil has been pursuing a path that has largely shielded it from the problems of the economic downturn but then faces bumps on that path because of its squabbling neighbours.
- blenCOWe
Another Published Essay
I guess I am on a bit of a roll right now. First my paper for the ATLIS journal is finally released this past week and now I've got another essay currently featured on the front page of the website e-IR.
e-IR is a really cool website that I have been reading for a while. It was started by a couple of students at some of the top universities in the UK including Oxford, Cambridge and Aberystwyth. The website covers a wide array of sub-fields in international politics, featuring editorials by some of the worlds leading academics and essays by students varied backgrounds and institutions.
Trust me, check it out!
- blenCOWe
e-IR is a really cool website that I have been reading for a while. It was started by a couple of students at some of the top universities in the UK including Oxford, Cambridge and Aberystwyth. The website covers a wide array of sub-fields in international politics, featuring editorials by some of the worlds leading academics and essays by students varied backgrounds and institutions.
Trust me, check it out!
- blenCOWe
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Some of Us Would Like an Answer or Even Some Visible Action!
Great article today in the Embassy about Canada's so-called campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council in the upcoming elections. It has been very hard to see what efforts the current government is making in order to strengthen Canada's case for the seat. I realize that a lot of diplomacy goes on behind closed doors (which is a topic already discussed frequently and one that I will save for another day) but there should be some visibility to the campaign. I think this quote sums it up succinctly;
"You don't win a Security Council campaign on the basis of a slogan or a tagline or posters or even cute little events," the former official said. "It's part of a complicated diplomatic process where a lot of it has to do with trading votes. 'I'll vote for you in this or that election if you vote for me on the Security Council.' It builds on bilateral relations.... You tug on the heart strings and remind them of all the great things you've done with them. You try to identify issues on which you share similar points of view. You commit yourself to consulting. That's how you win."
The problem is that Canada's track record right now isn't at its most convincing when trying to attract votes.
"what is clear is that Canada will have a much tougher challenge this time around. Recent policy decisions and actions taken by the government, like cutting aid to Africa, staunchly supporting for Israel, refusing to repatriate Omar Khadr, reticence on tackling climate change, and largely abandoned peacekeeping, are only going to hurt."
What exactly will Canada use to "tug on the heart strings" of other nations? Afghanistan...? That is likely to be a large portion of Canada's projected image as working to enhance international security, and it is true that Canadians should be proud of their forces. But with that mission being NATO led and with many European countries starting to rethink the mission, Canada's loud voice and strong stance next to the United States may actually hinder its chances to win some votes. When added to public debacles like cutting aid to Africa, Omar Khadr and more recently the Canadian woman who had to take a DNA test before the government would let her back into the country, Canada's image is probably not at its best right now.
I think what I, and many other Canadians, would like to see is a coherent and obvious strategy behind Canada's campaign. One that ignores partisan politics and is supported by all parts of the Canadian government. For this is not an issue party politics, it is an issue of working together to help Canada enhance its place in the international community.
- blenCOWe
"You don't win a Security Council campaign on the basis of a slogan or a tagline or posters or even cute little events," the former official said. "It's part of a complicated diplomatic process where a lot of it has to do with trading votes. 'I'll vote for you in this or that election if you vote for me on the Security Council.' It builds on bilateral relations.... You tug on the heart strings and remind them of all the great things you've done with them. You try to identify issues on which you share similar points of view. You commit yourself to consulting. That's how you win."
The problem is that Canada's track record right now isn't at its most convincing when trying to attract votes.
"what is clear is that Canada will have a much tougher challenge this time around. Recent policy decisions and actions taken by the government, like cutting aid to Africa, staunchly supporting for Israel, refusing to repatriate Omar Khadr, reticence on tackling climate change, and largely abandoned peacekeeping, are only going to hurt."
What exactly will Canada use to "tug on the heart strings" of other nations? Afghanistan...? That is likely to be a large portion of Canada's projected image as working to enhance international security, and it is true that Canadians should be proud of their forces. But with that mission being NATO led and with many European countries starting to rethink the mission, Canada's loud voice and strong stance next to the United States may actually hinder its chances to win some votes. When added to public debacles like cutting aid to Africa, Omar Khadr and more recently the Canadian woman who had to take a DNA test before the government would let her back into the country, Canada's image is probably not at its best right now.
I think what I, and many other Canadians, would like to see is a coherent and obvious strategy behind Canada's campaign. One that ignores partisan politics and is supported by all parts of the Canadian government. For this is not an issue party politics, it is an issue of working together to help Canada enhance its place in the international community.
- blenCOWe
My First Published Article
This past January, I presented a paper at the annual ATLIS Conference whose theme was on interventions. My paper, entitled In Search of an Identity: The Case for Niche Diplomacy in Canadian Foreign Policy, attempts to connect the concept of niche diplomacy with some of the current strengths and weaknesses found in Canadian foreign policy. Well, this spring it was accepted to be published in the ATLIS journal and now the new volume is up on the organization's new website. Take a look and feel free to send me your thoughts.
Here is the link: http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0809-journal-intervention/in-search-of-an-identity/
- blenCOWe
Here is the link: http://atlismta.org/online-journals/0809-journal-intervention/in-search-of-an-identity/
- blenCOWe
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Great Article on Youth and Politics
I think this article nails the problem right on the head. Youth in Canada have the education, awareness and issues that should push them into actively participating in the political arena, and yet the majority choose to reside on the sidelines. As a young Canadian who actively participates in the political process, I find the trend both maddening and inexplicable. Take a look at the article, it is definitely well thought out and articulated.
If there's and inspiration deficit in our politics, blame it on the young
- blenCOWe
If there's and inspiration deficit in our politics, blame it on the young
- blenCOWe
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